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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NEVE-WELCH ENTERPRISES, INC. ,
a Utah corporation, dba NEVEWELCH FURNITURE & APPLIANCE,
CASE NO. 17071
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
UNITED BANK,
Utah corporation,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

A

Defendant-Appellant

- -

-- -- - - - - - -

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _)_- - - - -- - - -- - - -- - - - ---- - - - - - - - -- - - BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Tr. refers to the Transcript on file in this action, and

R. refers to the Record on Appeal.

Ex. refers to Exhibit.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff against defendant to force
payment of a cashier's check isued by defendant at the request of a
~ird

party to the plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This action was tried without a jury in the Third District

Court in and for Salt Lake County, before the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, district judge, on February 4, 1980.

The court found in

favor of respondent and against appellant and awarded judgment on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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April 9, 1980, for the amount of the cashier's check in the amount
of $22,020.80, plus interest and costs.

The district court

refus~

to grant consequential or other damages to the plaintiff.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the judgment affirmed as to thE
portion of the judgment granting the amount of the cashier's check,
but seeks reversal of the court's ruling denying damages.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because respondent feels there are errors in the appellant's
statement of the facts the following statement of facts is made by
the respondent.
1. On or about April 21, 1979, the respondent, at the
suggestion of General Electric, and with the consent of Tri-Power
Electronics, transported to the business address of Tri-Power in
Salt Lake City, various appliances and items of merchandise to seL
on an independent basis at the close-out sale of Tri-Power,
sale was currently in progress at that time.

whi~

(Tr. 6-7,48)

2. The merchandise sold by the respondent was generally
segregated from that of Tri-Power (Tr. 9), contrary to the staternE~'
of the appellant.
3. The merchandise belonging to the respondent was

sold

during the course of the sale on the 21st and 22nd of April, 197 9 ·
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These items were sold as the separate property of Neve-Welch, the
respondent, as far as Tri-Power was concerned, and were sold by
respondent's own salesmen.

The proceeds from each sale were

commingled with those of Tri-Power with the understanding that
when the banks reopened on Monday the money would be divided and
Neve-Welch given its income from the sale.
its own receipts.

The respondent maintained

(Tr. 9-14)

4. During the course of the sale respondent's salesmen
actively promoted the name and business of respondent. (Tr. 10)
5. At the end of the sale on the evening of April 22nd, Mr.

Welch, who had been keeping a separate record of all of respondent's
sales (Tr. 12), was instructed by Mr. Klein, the president of
~i-Power,

to present his bill Monday morning to him and he would

call the bank and have a check cut for him.

(Tr. 12-13)

6. During the course of the sale all payments were in the
form of cash, checks or charges on bank cards (Tr. 13), all of
which amounts were paid to Tri-Power and none to respondent. (Tr.
13-14)

Mr. Welch had no dealings whatever with the money and all
collections were paid at the Tri-Power cash register and handled
exclusively by Tri-Power's agents.

(Tr. 17, 49)

7. During the course of the sale substantial amounts were
deposited with appellant by Tri-Power, which deposits included
Jn1ounts collected by respondent.

These deposits included a sizable
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deposit on Saturday of approximately $30,000.00.

(Tr. 52-53).

Contrary to appellant's statement, Mr. Klein was confident of
and approximate amount of this deposit.

t~J

(Tr. 52-53)

8. By the end of the business day on the 22nd

(Sunday~~

the respondent had received from the sale of its merchandise the;
of $22,020.80, which sum had been delivered to Tri-Power and dew 1
with appellant.

(Tr. 52-53, 11-14, Ex.'s 11-P, 12-P, 13-P).

9. At approximately 9:00 a.m. on Monday, the 23rd of Apn:,
Mr. Welch met with Lee Klein and they examined and totalled the
records Mr. Welch had kept and mutually agreed that the sum of
$22,020.80 was owing by Tri-Power to the respondent.
was no disputeas to the amount owing.

(Tr. 14)

Thi!

(Tr. 51)

10. After Mr. Klein and Mr. Welch reached an agreement as
to the amount owing, Mr. Klein telephone Mr. Loren Urry, an office:
of United Bank, and told him that Mr. Welch was coming down to tho
(Tr. 14-15,

o~

11. At that time there was no indication or statement by

i·lr.

bank, and asked him to cut a check for $22,020.80.

Urry to the effect that there was an overdraft or any problem wi0
the account, nor did Mr. Urry indicate any reluctance or probl~•~
issuing a check for the amount requested.
to appellant's statement

(Tr. 15, 51).

Contrary

on p. 3 of its brief, there was

ne~r

type of condition to the issuance of the check, including no cond;''
that a check would be issued on the condition that a deposit be
made by Mr. Klein.
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12. Immediately thereafter Mr. Welch left Tri-Power and went
directly to United Bank where he was introduced to Mr. Urry (Tr. 1516).

At that time some brief amenities were exchanged between the

two and the checkwas delivered by Mr. Urry to Mr. Welch. (Tr. 16)
13. Immediately thereafter Mr. Welch took the check to his
bank, Capital City State, and deposited;}ispondent's account. (Tr. 16)
14. At no time did Mr. Welch have any knowledge of the account
balance of Tri-Power at United Bank (Tr. 17), nor did he have any
knowledge of Tri-Power's banking status, credit standing, or anything
else dealing with its financial situation.
never discussed with Mr. Welch by Mr. Klein.

These matters were
(Tr. 53)

15. On Wednesday, April 25, an agent of United Bank delivered
a letter (Ex. 2-P) to Mr. Welch informing him that appellant had
stopped payment on the check.

(Tr. 19)

16. Shortly thereafter this action was commenced by respondent
to collect the amount of the check and consequential damages.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT IS OBLIGATED TO HONOR ITS CHECK ISSUED TO RESPONDENT
In the opening paragraphs of appellant's first point of
argument, they mis-state the issue.

This has never been an action

involving or alleging strict liability on a cashier's check.

No
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such finding was made by the court in its Findings,
and respondent has never made such an argument.

( R. 107, 134/,

However, as will

be shown, there is generally such a strict requirement for paymen·
imposed by the courts and the commercial code that one could almo'·
characterize the obligation as one of strict liability.

But it

should be remembered that for appellant to claim that the ruling
should be reversed because the court found that it was strictly lW
is clearly fallacious and improper argument for this appeal.

Such

an issue is simply not present.
The appellant in its Docketing Statement sets forth several
cases which it thinks disposes of the issues in this case in favorl
the appellant.

These cases are again set forth on page 7 of

appellant's brief.

However, these cases are not dispositive of ili

issues for the simple reason that they are not at all in point wW
the facts of this case.
These cases involve situations where the payee attempted to
defraud the bank, or another party, and was thus not a holder in
due course, with fraud being the defense.

At no time in this case

has there ever been the slightest bit of proof of any type of
misconduct, let alone fraud, on the part of the respondent.

The

dealings between respondent and appellant, Tri-Power, and any other
party even remotely involved have been spotless.

These cases thus

simply do not apply.
The appellant cites Dakota Transfer v. Merchant's Natio~
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Bank, 86 N.W.2d 639 (North Dakota, 1957), to support its propositioin.
However, this case, as with the others, is not in point.

In that

case the drawer presented a worthless check to the bank and
asked for a cashier's check in return.
this case.

No such thing happened in

Tri-Power, not plaintiff, made a deposit with United and

respondent was issued a cashier's check from Tri-Power's account at
the request of Tri-Power and with the full consent and knowledge of
appellant.
It is generally and widely recognized, with regard to a
cashier's check, that such a check is a bill of exchange drawn by
a bank upon itself and is accepted in advance by the act of its
issuance.

It is not subject to countermand by the issuing bank.

Arn.Jur.2d Banks, Sec. 643, p. 614;
and Trust, 495 S.W. 2d. 572 (Tex.);
550 S.W.2d.

383;

536 S.W.2d 14;

10

Wertz v. Richardson Heights sank
Bank of El Paso v. Powell, (Tex)

State ex.rel Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, (Mo.),
Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City National Bank,

365 A2d 1222 (Conn.); Bank of Niles v. American State Bank,

App.) 303 N.E.2d 186;

(Ill

Malphrus v. Home Savings Bank, 254 NYS 2d 980.

In the Malphrus case, supra., a depositor requested the bank
to issue a cashier's check to the seller of a car to the customer,
which the bank did.

The bank then stopped payment on the check.

The

Supreme Court threin stated that the bank could not stop payment on
the check, despite

u.c.c.

4-104(1) defining a customer to include

a bank carrying on business with another bank, and despite 4-403 of
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the U. C. C. providing that customer could stop payment.

The court

said a bank not a party to a transaction between the two parties
involved could have no standing or right to stop payment.

See

al;

18 A.L.R. 3rd 138,
Another point to be made is that "once the cashier's check
is negotiated to a holder in due course, the credit and resc
of the payee are no longer primarily involved;

it is then a primd!

obligation of the bank and, upon presentment of the check for
payment, the bank must honor the check." 10 Am. Jur2d, Banks, Sec.
643, p. 615.

It is also now well settl.ed that a payee may be a ho.I

in due course. 70A-3-302, U.C.A., 1953.
Thus, once a cashier's check is negotiated to a holder ini
course, the credit and resources of the purchaser are no longer
primarily involved or controlling;

it is then a primary obligatic:

of the bank and upon presentment of the check for payment, the bari
must honor the check.

See 70A-3-418, U.C.A., 1953;

Banks, Sec. 643, p. 615;
supra.;

10 Am.Jur.2d.

Bank of Niles v. American State Bank,

State ex. rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, supra.;

Citizens

Bank of Bonneville v. National Bank of Commerce, 334 F2d 257

(10th

Cir., 1964).
In May of 1979, the respondent filed an action in the Uni~
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, Central DivisiM
seeking reclamation of the funds deposited by Tri-Power for
Neve-Welch at United Bank.

The receiver for Tri-Power then fil~
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had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
which the court denied.

The second contention in the motion was

that the issuance of the cashier's check discharged the underlying
obligation.
On November 29, 1979, the Bankruptcy Court granted the motion
to dismiss on this second ground, which decision we ask this Supreme
Court to take judicial notice of.

The memorandum decision of the

Bankrutpcy Court, the honorable Ralph R. Mabey presiding, is of
importance here and we quote at length as follows:
A cashier's check is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank on its
own funds (on itself). By assuming the dual position of
drawer and drawee on the check, the bank injects into
circulation an instrument which is considered as equivalent to,
and a substitute for, the money it represents. Due to the
confidence of the commercial world in such instruments when
endorsed, such checks trade hands often and traverse many
financial transactions.
See Ross v. Peck Iron and Metal Co.,
264 F2d. 262 (4th Cir. 1959); Schwartz v. Twin City State
Bank, 201 Kan. 539, 441 P2d. 897 (1968).
Tri-Power authorized United Bank to issue such a check,
and to make it payable to Neve-Welch. This was done to pay
Neve-Welch the amount it had earned during the sale.
Tri-Power could be said to have purchased the cashier's
check from the bank in order to facilitate payment of the
debt.
By the act of issuance, United BAnk assumed the status
of drawer and drawee on the check, and by the act of receiving
the check, Neve-Welch completed the transaction. Such a
transaction is governed by UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-3-802 (1953),
which states:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument
is taken for an underlying obligation
(a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if the
bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of the
instrument, and there is no recourse on the
instrument against the underlying obligor.
Thus, Neve-Welch's act of "taking'' the check in recognition
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization
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of Tri-Power.
See Meckler v. Highland Falls Savings and~
Ass'n., 64 Misc. 2d. 407, 314 N.Y.S. 2d. 618 (Sup. Ct. rgf
Rushkin v. Central Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n., 3 u.c.
Rptg. Serv. 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Malphrusv Home·
Savings Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S. 2d. 980 (Alba~
County Ct. 1965).
Since Tri-Power has been relieved from liability on ti
instrument, its credit and resources no longer are subject
to the underlying obligation. Neve-Welch must now look ~1
issuing bank, which has the primary obligation on the checl.
and is the guarantor of payment.
See Ross v. Peck Iron anc
Metal Co., supra.;
Meckler v. Highland Falls Savings and
Loan Ass'n., supra.; Allison v. First National Bank of
Alburquerque,---asN".M. 283, 511 P2d 769, (N.M. App. 1973).
The second ground of defendant's motion is well taken.
The cashier's check discharged the debt between Tri-Power
and Neve-Welch in the stated amount and the motion to dism1
should be granted.
It is clear from this opinion, and the cases cited therein.
that appellant took upon itself the obligation in exchange for
the business and deposits of Tri-Power.

If appellant failed to ti

the necessary precautions; an innocent third party should not bear
the burden when it has relied on the issuance of the check.
The attitude and thinking of the appellant is evident in
an interesting exchange that occurred during the course of the

tt~

(BEGINNING AT PAGE 74 of the Transcript, line 14):

A. (Mr. Urry) Mr. Larner, one of the principals of the
corporation, was at my de~k and wanted to have us issue another
cashier's check, and I said there wasn't sufficient funds, so I~1
down to Tri-Power to get in touch with Mr. Klein.
He was not in
and so I talked with a Mr. George Speciale, who was the attorney
for Tri-Power, to confirm that those funds would be coming down
~
to our bank.
a
Q. When did you become aware of the bankruptcy of Tri-Power

t

':
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MR. B. WALL:
I object.
I fail to see the relevancy.
think that has any bearing on these issues.

I don't

THE COURT: I am having a little trouble myself, Mr. Olsen.
I
suppose that the issue here is the contractual relationship between
the bank and Mr. Welch, isn't it?
MR. OLSEN: No, I don't believe there is any contractual
relationship between the bank and Mr. Welch. What we're---THE COURT:
If a bank gives me a cashier's check, isn't there
at least an implied contractual relationship?
MR. OLSEN:
Well, I think that is the gist of our case, that
the cashier's check was issued without consideration and by mistake,
~d what we're saying is that Tri-Power was about to go under, that
everybody down there knew it was going to go under, that there was
a mad scramble to shift that loss off onto somebody else, and that
the bank was the last to find out about it, and thus they were
the ones who were left holding the sack.
THE COURT:
Doesn't the bank have an obligation only to issue
funds pursuant to what's on deposit in somebody's account?
I mean, if Mr. Urry got a call--I hate to argue in advance of
the evidence--but it seems to me if Mr. Urry gets a call from Mr.
Klein, saying "Issue a $20, 000 cashier's check and give it to
Mr. Welch and charge our account with it", the first thing he would
do is go to the account and make sure there are funds there to cover
that;
isn't that
MR. OLSEN:

That is correct.

THE COURT:
Then if he determines there are funds there, issues
the check.
Shouldn't he charge that account for that amount of money-MR. OLSEN: Issued, but if there are no funds and then he says,
"'lie wi 11 need further inquiry" and it's represented to him that the
funds will be brought in, and on the strength of that, he issues
the cashier's check when in fact the bankruptcy was imminent.
Everyone knew it was imminent except him.
That'w what we are
getting at.
THE COURT:
Well, my question--the question in my min dis
or not there is either a contractual or statutory obligation
and duty on the part of the bank to make sure that there are funds
to cover the cashier's check when it is issued.
I don't know
Sponsored
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As we have amply set forth above, virtually all of the case
cited state that the issuance of a cashier's check establishes
a contractual relationship between the bank and the payee, which
is somewhat analagous to a relationship on a promissory note.
What Mr. Olsen is arguing is that unilateral mistake was
present and the bank should be relieved of payment.
law.

This is not t:

"A mistake of only one of the parties to a contract in the

expression of his agreement or as to the subject matter does not
affect its binding force, and ordinarily affords no ground for
its avoidance, or for relief, even in equity." 17 C.J.S. Contracts.
Sec. 143, pp. 888-889.

Thus, where one party to a contract has

m~

a mistake, but such mistake is not known to the other party to the
contract, it is not invalidated.
U.S., 290 F2d 938;

Russell & Pugh Lumber Co. v.

Heifetz Metal Drafts, Inc., v. Peter Kiewit

Sons' Co., 264 F2d. 435.
From the excerpt above it is clear that appellant is
characterizing the situation as one having a condition at the time:
the issuance of the check where Mr. Olsen stated "We will need fur•·l
inquiry", which characterization is totally incorrect.

As can

be seen from the record there was never any condition to the issuac
of the check, especially between the bank and Mr. Welch.

Mr. urr:

himself stated that when Mr. Welch came in he told him nothing of'
condition of the account nor did he give him any reason that the
check would not be honored.

(Tr. 83, lines 23-28).
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\~hile

on this general point of argument, we should look at the

accounting procedures of the bank.

The appellant called Mrs. Nealley,

head bookkeeper for the appellant bank. Several points in her
testimony are quite interesting.

First, she was unable to show

or state that the bank had a record of the cashier's check in
the documents with her in court that day.

There was no record of

Tri-Power's account having been charged with the check, nor was there
any record of a stop payment or the effect that had on the account.
(Tr. 94)
Second, she could not show what the running balance of the
account was from late Friday until the close of business on the
following
~at

Monday, the 23rd.

(Tr. 96).

She could not tell the court

the hourly balance of the account was between Friday and Monday

afternoon.

Thus, considering the testimony of the respondent's

agents and Mr. Klein it is entirely possible and probable that
at the time the check was issued to Mr. Welch that there were in fact
sufficient funds in the account to cover the check.

This is of great

importance because the appellant has argued repeatedly that there
were insufficient funds,

if that has any relevancy,

but according

to their own bookkeeper the bank was unable to actually show
~at

the account balance was at the time the check was issued.

It would therefore appear that if in fact Mr. Urry was relying on
a balance figure when he issued the check, which is questionable,
he was relying on figures that were over two days old, and he was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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working from knowledge he had obtained the previous week, Mr.

Ur~

having been out of the bank for a number of days prior to Monday,
The foregoing authorities and arguments clearly support
an affirmtion of the judgment.

The authorities are clear that

a bank may not countermand its check, except in some very limited
situations.
point.

The authorities cited by the appellant are not in

The evidence of appellant is contradictory and unconvincioc

The cases are virtually unanimous in holding that".

• a cashier';

check may be generally regarded as the substantial equivalent of a
certified check in that neither can be countermanded and both
circulate in the commercial world as primary obligations of the
issuing bank as substitutes for the money represented.''(Emphasis ~~
Scharz v. Twin City State Bank, 441 P2d 897, at 899 (Kan. 1968).
If the respondent had received cash or had cashed the chectr
the bank after receiving it from Mr. Urry, it is clear that the bani,
would not be entitled to the monies.

See for example, State of

~m

v. Curtiss Natl. Bank of Mianli Springs, Fla., 427 F2d 395 (1970),
wherein a check was issued to the payees at the request of bank
customers.

The check was then cashed and the bank sought to

recover the funds from the payee.

The court stated that "the bank,

whether through its own negligence or through fraud practiced
upon it by the borrowers, has made an improvident loan.

A legal re·

course is to seek a judgment against the borrowers and assert its
rights in the collateral securing the loan;

it has no right to

recover the proceeds of the loan from persons who ultimately rece 0
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If this is the case, there is no sound reason for denying
the respondent the relief he demands merely because he deposited
the check rather than cashing it at the bank.
As the above decision states, the bank should have sought
the monies from the bankruptcy receiver and/or Walker Bank, and not
from the payee of the check.

For these reasons alone the judgment

should be sustained.

POINT II
THE RESPONDENT IS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE OF THE INSTRUMENT AND
IS ENTITLED TO AFFIRMATION OF THE JUDGMENT AS A RESULT THEREOF
70A-3-4l8, U.C.A., 1953, reads as follows:
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the
chapter on Bank Deposits and Collections (chapter 4) and
except for liability for breach of warranty on presentment
under the preceding section, payment or acceptance of any
instrument is final in favor of a holder in due course, or
a person who has in good faith changed his position in
reliance on the payment.
Appellant thus rests his entire case on whether or not the
respondent was a holder in due course.
70A-3-302, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, defines a holder in due
course as follows:
"(l) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the
instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith;

and

(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been
dishonored or of any defense against or claim
to
itLawon
the
part
of provided
any byperson."
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70A-3-303, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, defines taking for

~i

as follows:
"A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideratic·
has been performed or that he acquires a secur·
interest in or a lien on the instrument ot~~
than by legal process;
or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of
as security for an antecedent claim against ~
person whether or not the claim is due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for~
or makes an irrevocable cornmi tment to a third
person.
As to subsection (a) the respondent has performed all oft
consideration--it has given $22,020.80 to Tri-Power in exchange
for a cashier's check.

This money was in fact collected,

turn~

over to Tri-Power and deposited in Tri-Power's account with appeL:
As to subsection (b), defendant has misconstrued the whole
meaning of the comment and section cited.

The promise involved

does not concern what Tri-Power may or may not have told United Bar,

over the phone concerning deposits, etc., but the claims and prom;:o<
with which the section are concerned deal with obligations

betwee~

the payee, the plaintiff in this case, and the third party, towit: Tri-Power.

Appellant's further allegation that plaintiff ma\

may not have a claim against Tri-Power again completely ignores
the facts.

Defendant continually ignores that over $22,000 was

given to Tri-Power, a fact which has never been refuted or questi·:
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and an amount upon which Tri-Power agreed and has

~ade

no adverse

claim or made any denial towards.
As to subsection (c) of the cited statute, a negotiable
instrument was given to a third party, Tri-Power, by respondent,
to-wit: cash, checks, etc., totalling over $22,000.00.
The value given by the respondent is further emphasized
~

70A-3-802 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, which states:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken
for an underlying obligation
(a) the obligation is protanto discharged if a
bank is drawer, maker or acceptor of the
instrument and there is no recourse on the
instrument against the underlying obligor.
By issuing the cashier's check appellant bank paid and

discharged the obligation owed to Neve-Welch by Tri-Power and thus
·'· prevented Neve-Welch from being able to collect on the obligation
from any other source.
At the center of appellant's argument is the contention that
respondent must have paid the consideration directly to the bank,

;'' but this conclusion and interpretation are simply not supported by

the language of the cited statutes, their intent,

nor by the cases.

Appellant ignores that a payee may be a holder in due course.
See 70A-3-302, U.C.A., 1953 as amended.
notes, p. 446, states that the "

11 Am. Jur 2d, Bills and

• payee, like any other holder,

is regarded as prima facie a holder in due course • . .
In the case of Christensen v. Financial Service Co.,

(Utah,

l%3}, 377 Sponsored
P2d 1010,
held, at page 1012, that neither failiure of
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consideration nor any offset which maker might have had against
the payee's father was available as a defense against the payee
of the instrument where payee was a holder in due course of the
note involved.
The court in Christensen then went on to say that a payee
not a party to the original transaction, may be a holder in due cc.1
The court cited with approval Flores v. Woodspecialties, Inc.,
138 Cal. App.2d. 763, 292 P2d 626, wherein it was held that the
bank involved was a holder in due course even though it was payee

and the consideration it gave went to a third party.
There is also the requirement of acting in good faith to
qualify as a holder in due course.

70A-l-201 (19) defines good

f~

as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."
"The test of good faith in Section 1-201 ( 19) does not
require the holder of an instrument regular on its fact to
inquire as to possible defenses unless the facts known~~
holder are such that the failure to inquire discloses the
desire to evade knowledge for fear it would reveal a defensi
to the instrument." Midcontinent National Bank v. Bank of
Independence, Mo. Ct. of Appeals, 16 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. l~
523 S. W. 2d 569;
See al so General Investment Corp v. Angelir
58 N.J. 396, 278 A2d 193.
The respondent acted in accordance to established procedure;
of United Bank and showed no bad faith in requesting the check whir
it had been informed by Tri-Power would be available to respondent
on Monday morning.

Respondent relied on appellant's inquiry into ..

account of Tri-Power, and appellant's judgment as to the status of
that account, and respondent accepted the check as payment to
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the obligation in reliance upon the actions of appellant.

If there

has been any bad faith in this action it has certainly been on the
part of the appellant.

As stated previously, there has never been

any evidence of any wrong doing on the part of respondent at any stage
of these proceedings.
An additional requirement is that the payee act without notice
of any defect or defense to the instrument.

The cashier's check was

issued to resondent without any conditions or qualifications, and it
was regular on its face.

Respondent had no

actual or constructive

notice of any defense to it at the time of issuance.
position to have any knowledge.

It was in no

All knowledge of the account that

was then available was in the sole hands of appellant.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that respondent was and
is a holder in due course and entitled to the judgment on the check.

POINT III
THE COURSE OF DEALING OF TRI-POWER AND APPELLANT PRECLUDES
THE APPELLANT FROM STOPPING PAYMENT ON A CHECK TO AN INNOCENT
THIRD PARTY--THE RESPONDENT
As previously stated, a cashier's check is to be considered
to be an agreement analagous to a promissory note.

If there is

any question as to the purpose for the note or the circumstances
or conditions under which it is issued, respondent believes that
one is entitled to look at the prior course of dealing or usage of
trade between the parties.

70A-2-202 U.C.A., 1953, as amended,
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70A-l-205, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, provides in

parag~~

(1) as follows:
A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct betc,
the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly t:
regarded as establishing a common basis of understandi~~
interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
Subparagraph (2) provides as follows:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing h~r
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or t~~
as to justify an expectation that it will be observed witl
respect to the transaction in questions.
* * * "
It had been the practice of Tri-Power to call in and reque;
the issuance of a cashier's check on numerous occassions prior to
the time the check was issued to respondent, all of which was
without objection or complication.

~ITT

Tr. 58, beginning at 1 ine 18;

illustrative of this fact.
A. Yes.
We was.
It was not uncommon practice for me to c1:
the bank and tell them to issue a cashier's check, especial~
during the last week or two of our business.
Most of the people that did business with us would not acr~
a personal company check, and so I would assume I made that
kind of a phone call to Mr. Urry on 20 or 25 occasions to i~d
cashier's check.
Q. Did he ever object?

A. No. He deducted it from the account.
It is clear from these authorities that appellant had

be~

in the practice of issuing cashier's checks at Tri-Power's request
for some time, and that both Tri-Power and United Bank had been
accustomed to operating in this fashion and knew what to expect~
each other.

Accordingly, appellant should not now be permitted
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0 1ter

this procedure in mid-stream.

It is very clear that United

sank was accustomed to operating in this manner with Tri-Power
and must be estopped from asserting any claims of wrong doing
when

un~ted

had

issued numerous checks in the same manner as the

one involved in this action.

POINT IV
THE RULING OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT IS RES JUDICATA
AS TO ALL ISSUES HEREIN AND RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED
TO THE BENEFIT OF THAT COURT'S RULING
The effect of the ruling by the Federal Bankruptcy court
is res judicata as to the issue of pro tanto discharge, consideration,
and further has the effect of holding that the appellant is a holder
in due course.

These issues being determined in respondent's favor

require an affirmation of the district court's judgment pertaining to
amount of the cashier's check.

That ruling also determined

that United Bank was primarily responsible on the check and that
Neve-Welch had the right, the sole right, to look to the bank for
payment of the check.

POINT V
AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY THE JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED
Respondent makes the following two general arguments
in connection with the need for affirmation as a protection of
the interests of the public:
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( 1)

Many public and commercial interests rely heavily upor

the reliability of cashier's checks.

For appellant to act

irresponsibly and then claim foul invites all banks to

undermi~

the reliability of cashier's checks and issue them carelessly,
without regard to consequences and with impunity.
Appellant seeks to place cashier's checks in the same
category as the personal checks of the general public.

The re

of such treatment would be to allow banks to issue checks at

t~

request of individuals maintaining accounts at given banks withou:
regard to the account balance, and then permit the banks to
the checks, as they do with any other personal check, if
insufficient funds in the account.

di~c

there~

Such action would vitiate

the reliability placed in these checks and obviate a valuable too~'
of the commercial world.
(2) If appellant's position is accepted the payees of many
cashier's checks would be placed in jeopardy of being left wit~~
a remedy should the check be issued on an account without suffic1e'
funds.

This because of the effect of 70A-3-802, U.C.A., 1953, as

amended, which section discharges the underlying obligation.
Should this occur, and should the innocent payee be left without
a remedy against the irresponsible acts of the bank, then the paye
is completely without a remedy against either party.
essential that the banks issue checks only in proper

It is theref:I
circumsta~~

i.e., where the funds are present, or where the bank is dealing~
aSponsored
reliable
and good customer, as Mr. Urry characterized Tri-Power
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(Tr. 82), is willing to take the risk of advancing the funds.
To avoid chaos and the loss of a valuable commercial tool,
banks should be held to a strict standard and degree of liability
when they issue such a check.

POINT VI
THE RELIANCE ON THE CHECK BY RESPONDENT PRECLUDES
APPELLANT FROM STOPPING PAYMENT AND AVOIDING LIABILITY
70A-3-4l8, U.C.A., reads as follows:
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the
chapter on Bank Deposits and Collections (chapter 4) and
except for liability for breach of warranty on presentment
under the preceding section, payment or acceptance of any
instrument is final in favor of a holder in due course,
or a person who has in good faith changed his position
in reliance on the payment.
(Emphasis added)
There has never been a showing of any kind of bad faith on the
~rt

of the respondent in this action.

good faith is thus not in question.
~ange

The question of their

Did the respondent, then,

its position in reliance on the check.

Obviously, it

took the check with the understanding that the funds would be

available and under the cited authorities
respondent by Tri-Power was discharged.

the debt owed the
Had the bank told

Tri-Power that it would not issue such a check the respondent could,
in all likelihood, have made other arrangements to have secured
~e funds before any bankruptcy proceeding, was initiated,

or action could have been taken against the receiver to collect any
iunds

held by the receiver.

However, respondent was precluded from
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any of these options because of respondent's reliance upon the
issuance of the check by appellant.
Further, the respondent, after having deposited the check,
issued many checks on the account to pay off bills due to various
suppliers and other creditors.

All of this in reliance upon the

validity of the check. (See Tr.20 of Mr. Welch's testimony to the
end of his testimony.)

The testimony by Mr. Welch is replete with

facts indicating a changed position in reliance on the check, and
how the stop payment adversely affected the respondent.

There

can be absolutely no question that the respondent changed its
position in reliance of the check issued by appellant.

For this

reason alone the judgment should be affirmed.

POINT VII
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
- All of the facts and matters set forth in the appellant's
brief were duly considered by the Trial Court.

Findings of Fact

based upon all of the evidence should be sustained.

This Court

has long recognized the rule of law that Findings of Fact adopted
by the Trial Court should be sustained unless evidence clearly
preponderates against same.

In the case of Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 28 Ut. ~
368, 503 P2d 137 (1972), where the issue of the Trial Court's
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findings was attacked by the appellant, this court succinctly stated
it is " .

thJt

. a well settled rule of judicial review that the

trial court's findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
~ainst

the weight of the evidence or if it manifestly appears the

trial court misapplied the law to the established facts."
~~y

See also

v. Hendrickson, 27 Ut. 2d 251, 495 P2d 28.
In the case of Stucki v. Stucki,

(Utah, 1977), 562 P2d 240,

court stated:

this

"This Court must review the whole evidence in the light
most favorable to the findings of the Trial Court, and
will not disturb them merely because it might view the
matter differently, but only if evidence clearly
preponderates against the findings."
See
1

also the cases of Ridge v. Ridge,

v. Stone,

19 Ut 2d 378, 431 P2d 802;

(Utah), 542 P2d 189; Stone
Higginson v. Westergard,

(Idaho), 604 P2d 51.
The justification for this rule was clearly defined in
'!lakes
9~

v. Continental Mining

&

Milling Co., 6 Ut.2d 177, 308 P2d

(1957), wherein this court stated as follows:
. Credit should be indulged in favor of the findings of
the trial court because of the advantages peculiar to his
position in immediate contact with the trial.
It is indeed
often true, 'the manner hath more eloquence than naked
words portend.'
There are intangibles of expression and
attitude which give color meaning not apparent from words
alone.
The trial judge feels the impact of the personalities
of the parties and the witnesses:
He is able to observe their
appearance and behavior;
their forthrightness or hesitancy
in answering;
theri frankness and candor, or lack of it.
Similarly revealing to him are indications of surprise,
anger, resentment or vindictiveness, pleasure or other
emotions which may be discerned from expressions of the
countenance or voice.
He also has some advantage in
appraising their abilities to understand and their capacities
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to remember.
Furthermore, he is in a position to question
the witness himself to clarify doubtful points or verify
his impressions on the matters just mentioned.
All of this
combines to afford him better insight as to the truthfulness
of the testimony offered than does a perusal of the cold
record.
It is a sound and well recognized policy of the l~
to repose some confidence in the verity of the actions of
the trial court, and not to interfere with them unless it
clearly appears that he is in error."
(Footnote omitted)
Thus, in order for the appellant to prevail on appeal, the
evidence must clearly show that the trial court's findings are
arbitrary and capricious because they are not based upon
evidence.

sufficie~

In this matter a review of the evidence before the

court shows sufficient and preponderating evidence to support the
judgment of the trial court.
For example, the appellant's witnesses were unable to
definitely say that there were no funds in the account at the time
the check was issued, there was conflict as to the what transpired
over the telephone between Tri-Power and Mr. Urry, with the
witnesses for the respondent unequivocably stating that there
was no discussion as to account balance, conditions on the

issuan~

of the check, or anything else pertaining to the issues at hand.
These are only some of the examples, and the trial court's belief
in certain witness' testimony and the rejection of the testimony
of others should be upheld.

For this reason the judgment should

be affirmed.
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POINT VIII
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
REQUIRES AFFIRMATION OF THE JUDGMENT
The requirements to maintain an action of affirmation of
a judgment on the grounds of equitable estoppel are set forth in
the case of Celebrity Club,

Inc. v.

utah Liquor Control Comm.,

(Utah, 1979) 602 P2d 689, at 694 as follows:
(1) An admission, statement, or act
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted,
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such
admission, statement, or act, and
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such admission,
statement or act.
As to point number one, it is clear from the facts that
there were a number of statements, or acts on the part of the
appellant which preclude it from obtaining the relief demanded in
this appeal.

We have already shown at length the conversations

''1hich went on between Tri-Power and the bank, which show, despite
statements to the contrary by Mr. Urry/ which the court chose not

to believe, that there were no

conditions as to the issuance of

the check, there were no demands or anything else that would
~~ put the respondent on notice that

it should seek the

funds from another source and thus enable it to secure its position.
The course of dealing over an extended period of time had
8een

one of issuing checks on a telephone request, and oftentimes

',:1thout there being sufficient funds in the account.
1'dtter

All of these

s have been pointed out previously.
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The following testimony of Mr. Klein from Tri-Power is most
revealing:

(Tr. 56, line 30, to page 58, line 1)

Q. Did Mr. Urry, in your opinion, know of financial
problems of Tri-Power?

A. In my opinion, he did, yes.
Q. How do you know that he did?

A. I discussed it with him, and that was the reason
for his meeting with Mr. Malecker and Mr. Urry coming to
my office the week before the sale.
Q. How long had he known?

A. Well, you know, we had a hundred thousand dollan
certificate of deposit on file with United Bank for six or
seven months, and suddenly, after that, our funds started
dwindling and we started having some problems, and he start'
getting a little inquisitive as to why, and Loren and I-and Mr. Malecker and I would go to lunch from time to time,
and I told him.
He also knew we were looking for funds.
I was looking to borrow a substantial amount of
money and we of course asked our banking source if they
would loan it to us.
So they were very well awa.re that we
were having problems.
Q. Who is Mr. Malecker?

A. Mr. Malecker is, I guess, the manager of the
Q. Was he present at this close-out sale?

A. Mr. Malecker?
Q. Yes.

A. Yes, he was.
Q. Do you recall when?

A. It was Saturday.
Q. What was he doing?

A. He came in for a television set.
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Q. Had United Bank put any restrictions on your account

during the months prior to the April 23rd date?
A. None whatsoever.
It is clear from this, and other, testimony, that the
appellant knew all along the condition of Tri-Power and the status
of the account and general financial condition of Tri-Power.

The

manager of the bank was even in the store during the sale buying
a television set.

Yet despite all of this, the appellant has the

audacity to claim that they were completely in the dark and knew
nothing about the problems of Tri-Power and were the last ones
to know that anything at all was wrong.
As to requirements (2) and (3) requiring reliance to
1

detriment, the actions, reliance and injury of the respondent
have been amply pointed out in prior arguments, which actions and

reliance on the part of Neve-Welch were the direct result of the
issuance of the check.

The case of Morgan v. Board of State Lands,

(Utah, 1976), 549 P2d 695, states as follows:
Estoppel is a doctrine of equity purposed to
rescue from loss a party who has, without fault, been deluded
into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of another.
The measure we apply to plaintiffs' claim of estoppel is an
adaptation to this case of the standard heretofore approved
by this court:
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant Board)
by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his
silence when he ought to speak, intentionally or through
culpable negligence, induces another (plaintiffs) to believe
certain facts to exist and that such other (plaintiffs)
acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and
acts thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the
former (Land Board) is permitted to deny the existence of
such facts.
(Page 697)
This decision
squares with the facts of this case.
The bank
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had total control of the situation by being able to issue or
not issue the check and all parties involved relied on the bank's
knowledge, actions and representations.
these actions to its detriment.

The respondent relied on

For these reasons the judgment

should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The law is clear that when the bank issued the check a
contractual relationship was established between it and Neve-Welch
Furniture.

Neve-Welch acted in reliance on the actions of the

bank, and itself was completely free of any blame or wrong
doing.

The respondent collected the money and delivered it to

Tri-Power.

There is no question that the amount claimed was infact

collected and turned over to the Tri-Power and then deposited by
Tri-Power with the bank.

There is thus no question that the

respondent is a holder in due course and that it acted in good
faith, and relied upon the issuance of the check, all to its
detriment.
The only party in this case who is guilty of wrong doing is
the bank.

Appellant knew all along of the circumstances of Tri-

Power, yet now claims it knew nothing and is a completely
innocent party.

The facts simply do not support this or any

other contention of the appellant.

For these reaons, and the

oth~

arguments advanced by respondent above, we respectfully urge that
that portion of the judgment for $22,020.80 against appellant
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CROSS APPEAL

By virtue of the Notice of Preservation of Issue on Appeal
(R. 66), the respondent appeals from the failure of the District

court to grant respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

(R. 19-20), which shall be set forth hereinbelow as issue number
ooe of the Cross Appeal.

By virtue of the Notice of Cross Appeal (R. 148-149), the
respondent appeals from the District Court's ruling at the trial
of this case denying damages to the respondent, which question
shall form the second issue of the Cross Appeal below.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have a determination made that
as a matter of law the respondent was entitled to Summary Judgment
for the amount of the check and no further proceedings on said
issue should have transpired.
The respondent further seeks to have the trial court's
decision denying damages to repondent reversed and
remanded for a determination of the amount of damages due.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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The respondent herein filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (R. 19-20) wherein respondent was seeking judgment for
the amount of the check and reserving the issue of damages to
the time of trial.

The factual allegations of appellant's

case were supported by appellant's Affidavit in Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment,

(R. 44-46), and Answers to

Interrogatories (R. 27-37).
The respondent's

pr:inary

factual position was supported

by various affidavits (R. 41-43, and 38-40).

Subsequently,

the respondent filed anCbja:::ticn to Affidavit of Defendant in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 63), and Objection
to Answers to Interrogatories (R. 62), which were filed with the ,
court at the time of the hearing on the motion.

These objections

set forth the grounds for objecting to various statements made
by appellant in the Affidavit and Answers to Interrogatories,
which included objections based on hearsay, lack of foundation,
lack of relevancy, lack of responsiveness, etc.
It is the position of the respondent that had these objectio'.
been sustained there would have been no factual issues left for
trial, and that as a matter of law the respondent would have
then been entitled to judgment as requested in the motion.
An examination of the pleadings involved clearly point out
that all of the important statements made by appellant's agent
in the Affidavit and Answers are based on hearsay, lack foundatiM
and have other problems which require that they be ignored for
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However, the court committed error by refusing to sustain
the objections.

As a matter of fact, and most important of all,

the court failed to even rule on the objections and without giving
the objections the credit due went ahead, despite the objections,
and denied the motion.
Accordingly, the court should have ruled on the objections,
the court should have sustained the objections, and had this
occured the factual issues would have remained in favor of the
respondent.

The factual issues being in favor of

the respondent

the respondent was then entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 Ut.2d 383, 453 P2d 701; Rule 56(e),
U.R.C.P.
For these reasons the ruling denying Motion for Summary
Judgment should be reversed.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY
REFUSING TO GRANT DAMAGES TO THE
RESPONDENT AT THE TIME OF TRIAL
As is apparent from the arguments and authorities advanced
by the respondent above, the issuance of a cashier's check by a

bank constitutes a separate agreement to pay the amount of the
check, which most authorities liken to a situation where a
promissory note is involved.

In this matter the failure of the

bank to pay and honor the check constitutes a breach of that
agreement or contract.

Accordingly, the issue arises as to what
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damages the respondent is entitled to as a result of this breach,
in addition to the amount of the check.
In this matter the respondent alleges error by the court
in failing to award any damages whatosever, including

punative,~

consequential, including loss of profits, damage to credit
reputation, etc.
70A-4-402, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, provides as follows:
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximate!.
caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item.
When the
dishonor occurs through mistake liability is limited to
actual damages proved.
If so proximately caused and
proved damages may include damages for an arrest or
prosecution of the customer or other consequential damages.
Whether any consequential damages are proximately caused ~
the wrongful dishonor is a question of fact to be detecmined
in each case."
(Emphasis added)
"Wrongful dishonor" means a dishonor done in a wrong manner,
unjustly, unfair, in a manner contrary to justice.

See "Wrongful"

46 Words and Phrases, p. 488.
"Mistaken dishonor" means a dishonor done erroneously,
unintentionally, a state of mind that is not in accord with the
facts.

See "Mistake" 27 Words and Phrases, p. 568.

A wrongful

dishonor may also include checks issued through mistake.

See

Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 745, 418 P2d
191 • 198 ( l 966 ) •
An intentional or wilful or malicious dishonor permits an
award of punative damages.

See Allison v. First National Bank o_L

Albuquerque, 511 P2d 769.
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"Consequential damages" are not defined in the Commercial
,~nde,

but they are in other sources,

In 3 Anderson, Uniform

commercial Code, 2nd Ed., p. 306, the author states as follows:
"Damages for Wrongful Dishonor.
A payor bank is liable to
its customer for the damages proximately caused by the
virongful dishonor of an item.
The damages may include
consequential damages (such as those sustained in connection
with an arrest and prosecution), provided they are proximate
damages.
Whether the consequential damages are proximately
related to the wrongful dishonor is a question of fact and
not of law.
"Consequential damage" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary,
"hird Ed., as "such damage, loss or injury as does not flow
directly and immediately from the act of the party, but only from
the consequences or results of such act."
"Consequential damage" includes injuries to credit as a
result of wrongful dishonor.
" . . . any

Loucks, supra.

It also includes

. consequential harm, loss or injury proximately

caused by a wrongful dishonor.
146 Ind. App.

." A.F.N.B. v. Flick,

122, 132, 252 N.E.2d 839, 845 (1969).

It is also well recognized that damages may be recovered in
many instances where there has been a breach of contract, including
damages for lost profits.
"Under most authorities, as a general rule a party
not in default is, in case of a breach of contract due to
the fault or omission of the other party, entitled to
recover profits which would have resulted to him from
performance.
In order that it may be a recoverable
element of damages, the loss of profits must be the natural
and proximate, or direct, result of the breach complained
of and they must also be capable of ascertainment with
reasonable or sufficient certainty, or there must be some
bcisis on which a reasonable estimate of the amount of profit
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can be made;
absolute certainty is not called for or
required." 25 C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 43, pp. 742-746.
(Emphasis added).
(See many cases thereunder in support oi
this statement)
As to our al legation of lost profits, several ways of proof
are available to the plaintiff in such an action.

Obviously, if

the facts point to a definite loss situation and particular facts
resulting in a definite loss then that amount is obviously
recoverable.

The plaintiff is also permitted to "

actual profits and receipts realized in the past in the

show the
partic~M

business or enterprise in order to furnish a reasonable basis for
estimating the amount of profits lost by him."
Sec. 158(b), p.66.

25A C. J. S. , Damage!

This Supreme Court has followed this rule

stating in the case of Clawson v. Walgreen Drug, 162 P2d 759,

~

:

~~

the measure of damages for impairment of earning capacity is the f
difference between the amount which plaintiff was capable of
earning before his injury and that which he was capable of earning '
thereafter.
In the case of Jenkins v. Morgan, 260 P2d 532, at 535,
(Utah, 1953), this court stated:
. Before special damages for loss of profits to a
general business occasioned by the wrongful acts of anot~r
may be recovered, it must be made to appear that the
business had been in successful operation for such a peri~
of time as to give it a permanency and recognition, and
that such business was earning a profit which could be
reasonably ascertained and approximated"
These cases and authorities only require, after showing t~
losses sustained, that such loses were the natural and probable
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consequence of the wrongful act of the defendant or defaulting
In this action the wrongful act is the failure of the bank

party.

to honor the check, which they had an obligation to honor and pay.
Respondent has also alleged various other damages, which
include loss of credit or damage to business credit and reputation.
rt is well

recognized that the loss of business credit and

reputation, injury to business and other pecuniary losses
constitute proper elements of damages.
Sec. 55, pp. 806-808).

(See 25 C.J.S., Damages,

See also C.C.E. Federal Credit Union v.

Chesser, 258 S.E.2d 2 (Ga., 1979), for damages to credit.
See also, for example, the case of Air Technology Corp. v.
General Electric Co.,

(Mass) 199 N.E.2d 538, wherein the court

held that damages for loss of business opportunity were to cover
all aspects of opportunity of which plaintiff had been deprived
as long as the several elements of damages were reasonably
ascertainable.
In this action the damages are ascertainable, and the most
important authority cited, 70A-4-402, U.C.A., together with the
~

and Allison cases cited supra. clearly provide that

a wrongful, improper, etc., dishonor of a cashier's check by a
bank is a basis for awarding all consequential damages, which
the evidence in this case clearly shows lost profits, damage to
c~dit

reputation, etc., etc.
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The testimony of Mr. Welch, begninng at Tr. 21 to the end
is replete with facts evidencing the extent of the lost profits,
lost opportunities, damage to credit reputation, etc., which
damages are considerable.

While it may not seem as though the

J~

of the amount of the check would affect a business to the extent
claimed, the lengthy testimony of Mr. Welch details the peculiar
situation of the respondent corporation and the effect the lost
money had on the company.
Exhibits 6-P, 8-P, and 9-P also provide additional detail
and support to the losses claimed.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the authorities cited the respondent is

entitl~

to damages as a matter of law if respondent is able to prove the
damages.

These damages were proved by extensive, detailed

testimony by Mr. Welch, and the exhibits he prepared and submitted,
which exhibits were received by the court.

Therefore, the j udgmen'.

denying such damages was in error and should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

BRANT H. WALL
GREGORY B. \'JALL
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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